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“I thought I was the president, but when it comes to these bureaucrats, 
I can’t do a damn thing.” 
—Harry S. Truman (Nathan, 1983)
The President and the Federal Reserve
Presidential administrations are highly concerned with what the Federal 
Reserve (Fed) does (Cohen and Hamman, 2003). This independent bureau-
cratic agency, created in 1913, is charged with being the central bank of the 
United States; it is supposed to maximize employment, moderate long-term 
interest rates, set monetary policy, and manage inflation by raising and/or 
lowering interest rates on monies loaned to banks, which substantially affects 
the overall economy (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008; Morris, 2000; 
Morris and Munger, 1998; Frumkin, 2004; Auerbach, 1985; Krause, 1994; 
Shull, 2005). Therefore, presidents have been trying to garner influence with 
the Fed since its inception (Worsham, 1997).
As many presidents do, Nixon often talked about the proper balance be-
tween inflation and unemployment and the Federal Reserve’s role in bring-
ing about what is necessary for a healthy economy, particularly the Federal 
Funds Rate (FFR), which when raised or lowered can stave off inflation or a 
recession. President Nixon went to great lengths to influence the decisions 
and monetary policy of the Fed during his chairmanship. In fact, Arthur F. 
Burns was nominated, in part, because it was thought that he would listen to 
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Nixon and follow monetary policy directions from the administration. Presi-
dent Nixon, at the swearing in of the Federal Reserve Chairman Burns, said 
“I do have the opportunity as president to convey my views to the chairman 
of the Federal Reserve.” Moreover, the president indicated that he had “some 
very strong views on some of [the] economic matters . . .” and that he could 
“assure . . . that [he would] convey them privately and strongly to Dr. Burns.” 
He continued by saying that he “hope[ed] that independently [Dr. Burns 
would] conclude that [President Nixon’s] views are the ones that should be 
followed” (Woolley and Peters, 2014—“Richard Nixon, 1970”). 
President Nixon never tried to hide or mask his attempts to “influence” 
the independent agency in its decisions pertaining to the direction of mone-
tary policy. Nixon is known to have said to Arthur Burns, “I know there’s the 
myth of the autonomous Fed . . . and when you go up for confirmation some 
Senator may ask you about your friendship with the president. Appearances 
are going to be important” (Abrams, 2006). There are numerous recorded 
conversations that illustrate Nixon’s attempts to influence the Chairman 
and the Agency. The following are quotes from Abrams (2006):
October 23, 1969
My relations with the Fed, will be different than they were with [previous 
Federal Reserve chairman] Bill Martin there. He was always six months too 
late doing anything. I’m counting on you, Arthur, to keep us out of a recession.
October 10, 1971
I don’t want to go out of town [losing the presidential election] fast . . . this 
will be the last Conservative administration in Washington.
December 24, 1971
Do you feel, as far as Arthur [Federal Reserve chairman] and the money supply, 
we got that about as far as we can turn it right now, have we? I mean as far as 
my influence on him, that’s what I’m really asking.
February 14, 1972
War is going to be declared if he [Chairman Arthur Burns] doesn’t come 
around some.
February 14, 1972
I don’t much, I really don’t care what you [Arthur Burns] do in April, but 
between now and April . . . that can hurt us . . . in November.
Abrams (2006) indicates, however, from recorded conversations between 
President Nixon and George Shultz (Director of OMB), that the White 
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House received a firm commitment from Chairman Burns to expand mon-
etary policy.
The speculation that Nixon was able to exert influence over the Federal 
Reserve and get them to acquiesce to an expansionary monetary policy and 
agenda seems to have a semblance of legitimacy. The accusations abounded 
during Arthur F. Burns tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman, suggesting the 
Fed followed the directions and pressures from the president. According 
to William Safire, Nixon’s speechwriter, the pressures extended to leaking 
negative newspaper stories about Burns’s personal life so that he would toe 
the line (Abrams, 2006). Moreover, there were threats to change the number 
of members on the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). This 
would have given Nixon an opportunity to change the “majority,” which 
would have given him more leverage to expand credit and the money supply 
(Abrams, 2006). 
A few Nixon Administration officials stated that the chairman had the 
FFR changed, as a result of the pressure, to facilitate in the advancement of 
President Nixon’s agenda and reelection. Chairman Burns is recorded as say-
ing, in multiple instances, “I wanted you [President Nixon] to know that we 
lowered the discount rate . . . got it down to 4.5 percent” (Abrams, 2006). 
Again, he tells the President that the FOMC was put “on notice that through 
this action that [he] want[s] more aggressive steps taken by [the] committee 
on next Tuesday”—indicating that he is following President Nixon’s direc-
tions (Abrams, 2006). Abrams (2006) says, “the economic data supports the 
view that the Federal Reserve had already become decidedly more expan-
sionary as Burns had promised.”
After the 1972 election and later when President Nixon had resigned, 
the economy progressively soured, inflation reached over 12 percent and a 
recession followed (Abrams, 2006; Bartlett, 2004). Many blamed Chairman 
Burns for the declining economy; he was an esteemed economist and had to 
be aware of the economic consequences of expanding the monetary policy. 
Abrams (2006) says, 
Without invoking political pressure, the surge of expansionary monetary 
policy leading up to the 1972 election seems hard to explain. After all, Arthur 
Burns knew better than to run a heavily expansive monetary policy after the 
recession had ended in November 1970 and in an already-inflationary envi-
ronment.
Nevertheless, a researcher can never fully ascertain if Chairman Burns suc-
cumbed to the pressure from President Nixon, aside from him stating clearly 
that he did. Chairman Burns was highly intelligent and understood the 
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economy; he simply could have done what he thought was the right thing 
to do in terms of economic policy. Despite his intelligence and economic 
skills, his actions could have been incorrect. Moreover, the phone conversa-
tions could easily be explained by saying that Chairman Burns was telling 
the president what he wanted to hear while on the phone and then pursuing 
what he thought was the best course of action at the Fed. There are other 
conversations wherein President Nixon emphatically expresses his distrust 
of Burns and others wherein Burns expresses his ideals for economic policy 
to Nixon. As a matter of fact, however, the Federal Funds Rate did change 
during the time in question.
Arthur Burns joined the Federal Reserve on February 1, 1971, during a 
time when the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) was steadily decreasing, beginning 
the process of expanding the amount of money available and keeping infla-
tion down. Expanding the amount of money was directly in line with what 
Nixon wanted, as he thought the Fed’s decision to contract the economy 
precluded his presidential victory in 1960 (Abrams, 2006). Nixon said prior 
to the election in 1972, 
Arthur Burns, in terms of monetary policy and in terms of fiscal policy, has 
followed a course that I think is the most responsible and statesmanlike of any 
chairman of the Federal Reserve in my memory. In other words, you have seen 
an expansionary monetary policy, and that is one of the reasons we have had 
an expansionary economy in the first six months of this year (Woolley and 
Peters, 2014—“Richard Nixon, 1971”).
In that same speech, President Nixon may have shown his hand in a very 
revealing manner when he said, “So we find that Burns agrees—that I agree 
with Burns, let’s put it that way. I agree with Burns very strongly on his 
monetary policy, on his fiscal policy” (Woolley and Peters, 2014—“Richard 
Nixon, 1971”).
History is riddled with instances, anecdotal however, wherein the deci-
sions of the Federal Reserve have mirrored the wishes of the sitting president. 
Given the Federal Reserve’s noted independence from political control, 
whether the president influenced the Fed is noteworthy, given our under-
standing and commitment to separated institutions sharing power. Nixon’s 
comments and Chairman Burns’ decisions warrant further and more compre-
hensive inquiry into whether or not Arthur Burns used his position as chair-
man of the Federal Reserve to get the FOMC to change the Federal Funds 
Rate and the direction of monetary policy, at the expense of the economic 
health of the United States, to aid in Nixon’s reelection.
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The following chapter offers a quantitative explanation regarding presi-
dential influence with one of the most significant economic actors. How 
can the president assert influence over one incredibly important aspect of 
the economy if he cannot even get the economic actor to listen to him? 
The findings serve to highlight the glaring flaw in the prevailing argument 
that presidential rhetoric matters in the sense that it can persuade or influ-
ence—as the most important economic actors are not even paying attention 
to what the president is saying. The findings provide a contribution to the 
contentious discussion in the literature on presidential relations with the 
Federal Reserve regarding the president’s capacity to influence monetary 
policy (Krause, 1994; Havrilesky, 1995; Beck, 1982; Morris, 2000; Nathan, 
1983; Wood and Waterman, 1994; Weintraub, 1978; Maisel, 1973). 
Nevertheless, I consider the literature regarding the limitations presiden-
tial appointments to the Federal Reserve Board have and address how presi-
dential rhetoric factors into the Fed’s decision-making regarding monetary 
policy. From ascertaining the overall ineffectiveness of presidential rhetoric 
and signals to the Fed, I posit a theory and empirical model that suggests the 
Federal Reserve is more responsive to Congress and current economic condi-
tions when making monetary policy decisions.
Garnering Influence with the Federal Reserve
In order to gain influence over the economy, particularly monetary policy, 
presidents often try to put pressure on the Federal Reserve, using every mech-
anism their office and institution afford to them (Howell, 2003; Havrilesky, 
1995). Presidents typically try to shape the Fed with appointments to the 
seven-member Board of Governors. Moreover, presidents often use cues and 
signals to the Fed to indicate what direction they want them to take mon-
etary policy. Typically, the cues consist of changes in fiscal policy and calls 
for the Fed to address inflation or unemployment, areas that substantively 
impact the economy.
Historically, there is a desire for presidents to influence the Fed; however, 
there is considerable disagreement about the extent to which the influence 
is successful or effective (Krause, 1994; Havrilesky, 1995; Beck, 1982; Morris, 
2000; Auerbach, 1985; Nathan, 1983; Wood and Waterman, 1994; Wein-
traub, 1978; Maisel, 1973). According to many scholars, presidents have 
struggled to garner influence with the Fed, partly because it is an indepen-
dent agency (Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor, 1993; Havrilesky, 1995; 
Wood and Waterman, 1994; Morris, 2000; Cohen and Hamman, 2005; 
Munger and Roberts, 1990). For instance, the discretion by the Fed, where 
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their localities lie, and to whom they are accountable are all factors that keep 
scholars continually trying to model this relationship and ascertain insight 
into who is able to pressure the Fed and their monetary policy decision-
making (Brehm and Gates, 1997)?
Appointments
Presidents attempt to use appointments to shape the monetary policy deci-
sions at the Federal Reserve (Krause, 1994; Beck, 1982; Dolan, Frendreis, 
and Tatalovich, 2008). There is a vast literature claiming presidents are 
effective at doing this (Golden, 2000; Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor, 
1993; Havrilesky and Gildea, 1992; Havrilesky, 1995; Nathan, 1983; Water-
man, 1989; Wood and Waterman, 1994). There are still substantive gaps, 
however, in the arguments, which have not done a satisfactory job of ex-
plaining the presidential influence with the Fed empirically and comprehen-
sively (Munger and Roberts, 1990). There seems to be an assumption that 
presidents are able to influence monetary policy with their appointments 
(Auerbach, 1985; Hibbs, 1987; Weintraub, 1978; Maisel, 1973).
The decisions that the Fed makes can sabotage or undermine the policy 
goals of the presidents (Brehm and Gates, 1997). In addition, the structure 
of the relationship allows the Fed to achieve agency-oriented goals, which 
are purely self-interested (Downs, 1967). This means that the requests 
that come from the president are not precisely what will be pursued and 
implemented at the Fed. Moreover, even though it features a seven-member 
board of governors, appointed by the president, there is no guarantee that 
the appointees will remain loyal to the policies of the president (Edwards 
and Wayne, 1985). Many appointees in bureaucratic agencies “go native” 
once they are immersed in the agency culture and begin advocating for the 
plans of the agency rather than those of the president who appointed them 
(DiClerico, 2000).
While, such a statement is somewhat true, one has to consider the subtle-
ties of the appointment process to obtain a more accurate picture of the 
degree to which appointments empower presidents to shape monetary policy 
(Keech and Morris, 1997). Upon further inquiry, the realities of presidential 
influence at the Fed are significantly less potent than commonly assumed 
(Keech and Morris, 1997).
Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993), as discussed in Keech and 
Morris (1997), argue that Democratic presidents, more than Republican 
presidents, typically appoint those members who prefer lower interest rates. 
This fact, they claim, enables presidents to “pack” the Fed with like-minded 
persons who will then change Fed monetary policy. The reality, however, is 
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that presidents have not enjoyed the opportunity to appoint majorities to the 
Fed board of governors very often (Keech and Morris, 1997). As illustrated 
by table 3.1, presidents spend most of their time in office, in fact, before they 
are able to make enough appointments to have a majority at the Fed. 
To further complicate the “packing” argument, presidents must contend 
with the “Earl Warren Effect” when making appointments to the Federal Re-
serve—namely appointees completely follow a different policy path than the 
one desired by the appointing president (Morris, 2000, p. 73). Havrilesky and 
Table 3.1.  Presidential Appointments to the Board of Governors.
Membership the Federal Reserve System (1953–2012)
D. D. Eisenhower 
1953–1961
Wm. McC. Martin, Jr. 1956 –1970
C. Canby Balderston 1954–1966
A.L. Mills, Jr. 1958–1965
Paul E. Miller 1954–1954
Chas. N. Shepardson 1955–1967 G.H. King, Jr. 1959–1963
J. F. Kennedy 
1961–1963
George W. Mitchell 1961–1976
L. B. Johnson 
1963–1969
J. Dewey Daane 1963–1974
Andrew F. Brimmer 1966–1974
Sherman J. Maisel 1965–1972
William W. Sherrill 1967–1971
R. M. Nixon 
1969–1974
Arthur Burns 1970–1978
Jeffrey M. Bucher 1972–1976
John E. Sheehan 1972–1975
Robert C. Holland 1973–1976
Henry C. Wallich 1974–1986
G. R. Ford 
1974–1977
Philip E. Coldwell 1974–1980
J. Charles Partee 1976–1986
Philip C. Jackson, Jr. 1975–1978
Stephen S. Gardner 1976–1978
David M. Lilly 1976–1978
J. E. Carter 
1977–1981
G. William Miller 1978–1979
Emmett J. Rice 1979–1986
Nancy H. Teeters 1978–1984
Frederick H. Schultz 1979–1982 
Paul A Volcker 1979–1987 Lyle E. Gramley 1980–1985
R. W. Reagan 
1981–1989
Preston Martin 1982–1986
Wayne D. Angell 1986–1994
Martha R. Seger 1984–1991
Manuel H. Johnson 1986–1990 
H. Robert Heller 1986–1989 Edward W. Kelley, Jr. 1987–2001
Alan Greenspan 1987–2006 John P. LaWare 1988–1995
G. H. W. Bush 
1989–1993
David W. Mullins, Jr. 1990–1994
Susan M. Phillips 1991–1998
Lawrence B. Lindsey 1991–1997  
W. J. Clinton 
1993–2001
Alan Greenspan 1987–2006
Janet L. Yellen 1994–1997
Alan S. Blinder 1994–1996
Laurence H. Meyer 1996–2002        
Alice M. Rivlin 1996–1999 Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. 1997–2006
Edward M. Gramlich 1997–2005
G. W. Bush 
2001–2009
Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. 1997–2006
Mark W. Olson 2001–2006
Susan S. Bies 2001–2007 
Ben S. Bernanke 2002–2006
Donald L. Kohn 2002–2010 Kevin M. Warsh 2006–2011
Randall S. Kroszner 2006–2009 Frederic S. Mishkin 2006–2008
Elizabeth A. Duke 2008–2013 
B. H. Obama 
2009–
Daniel K. Tarullo 2009–
Janet L. Yellen 1994–1997
Jeremy C. Stein 2012– 
Sarah Bloom Raskin 2010–
Jerome H. Powell 2012–
[AU Query 5]
Adapted from Federal Reserve Official Website, 2014.
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Gildea (1992) found that from 1951–1987 the presidential appointments to 
the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) did not always vote for 
the policy preferences of those presidents who appointed them.
Moreover, appointments to the Fed are similar to appointments to the 
Supreme Court; there has to be agreement with the political, business, and 
economic communities in order to secure a position on the Federal Reserve 
Board (Beck, 1982). Divided government and election proximity keep par-
tisan appointees from confirmation by the Senate (Waller, 1992). In fact, 
many of the appointments are persons who have risen through the ranks at 
the Fed; they are not politically partisan appointments from campaign staff, 
but rather “experts” who have already been “institutionalized” at the Fed. 
Just as important, presidential appointments do not provide any significant 
level of influence over the Fed’s FOMC’s decision-making when compared to 
the influence that takes place from within the Fed, particularly with regard to 
consensus within the FOMC and the Fed chair (Krause, 1994). Presidential 
appointments of the Chair of the Federal Reserve are not correlated with 
significant changes in Fed monetary policy (Chang, 2001; Beck, 1987; Rose, 
1991; Maisel, 1973; Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1978; Krause, 1994). Moreover, 
there is also no substantive evidence that appointments to the Fed’s FOMC 
had any influence on policy either (Chang, 2001). 
Where there is change in the predicted median influence, the data do not 
tell us if the influence is coming from the president or the Senate, who may 
be, and often are, at odds with one another (Chang, 2001). In the instances 
where there were substantial changes to the Fed’s monetary policy, it is more 
likely that the changes were a result of external pressures from Congress or 
the changing/shifting world economy rather than a result of presidential ap-
pointments, policy preferences, or rhetorical cues from the president (Beck, 
1982; Saeki and Shull, 2003).
Based upon the extant empirical literature, there is no theoretical justi-
fication to include appointments into the following statistical model. The 
extant research does a thorough job refuting the notion that presidents can 
influence monetary policy with appointments to the Federal Reserve. Nev-
ertheless, I included this section to highlight the fact that even a concrete 
power that the president has with the Federal Reserve does not grant him 
influence over the agency or their decision-making. If the appointment 
power does not afford presidents influence, the likelihood that rhetoric does 
is even less probable. 
Granted, one could argue that the Fed might pay attention to what the 
president says and act accordingly with regard to the FFR when there is a 
vacancy in the hopes that the president will appoint someone of which the 
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Fed approves. However, I discuss this and the literature later. The president 
is going to appoint someone that the Senate will confirm. Therefore, it is not 
likely that the Fed would go against what Congress wants in an attempt to 
get some shortsighted gain, because, in fact, the president is not really going 
to go against what the Senate wants due to the fact that he knows the person 
would not likely obtain confirmation anyway.
Rhetorical Cues and Signals
The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, along with many of 
his colleagues, believes that the stimulation needed to make the economy 
better occurs by changing the way elite economic policymakers talk about 
the best direction for the economy (Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano, 
2012). Given their position and the size of the president’s constituencies, 
it seems to assert that presidents would be able to influence this particular 
economic actor directly with cues and signals.
More importantly, there are instances where Fed chairmen have stated 
that presidential requests and cues have changed the behavior of the Fed, 
particularly during the Johnson Administration (see table 3.2). There are 
also a few claims in the literature stating that the Fed has manipulated the 
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) during elections to either help or hurt the incum-
bent president, as discussed earlier (Beck, 1987; Maisel, 1973; Nordhaus, 
1975; Tufte, 1978). These claims were prevalent during the election of 1972. 
Table 3.2.  Presidential Administrations and the Chairman of the Fed.
Federal Reserve System (1953–2012)
William McChesney Martin, Jr. 
1951–1970
Dwight D. Eisenhower      John F. Kennedy 
Lyndon B. Johnson         Richard M. Nixon
Arthur F. Burns
1970–1978
Gerald R. Ford             James “Jimmy” E. Carter
G. William Miller
1978–1979
James “Jimmy” E. Carter 
Paul A. Volcker
1979–1987
Ronald W. Reagan
Alan Greenspan
1987–2006
George H. W. Bush         William J. Clinton 
George W. Bush
Ben Bernanke
2006–2014
George W. Bush           Barack H. Obama
Janet Yellen
2014–
Barack H. Obama
Adapted from Federal Reserve Official Website, 2014.
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Many of those supposedly involved either denied the accusations or recanted 
later what had been said (Beck, 1982). 
When controlling for the president and the Fed Chairman, however, 
there is a statistical effect for changes in monetary policy (Havrilesky, 1995). 
The response of monetary policy to signals does not continue for all presi-
dents and chairmen; it only exists for certain periods. For instance, the FFR 
changed when Arthur Burns was the chairman under presidents Nixon and 
Ford, but not when it was William Martin. The same chairman with the 
Carter Administration shows no influence. When President Carter switched 
to Chairman Volcker, the monetary policy did react to the signals. This con-
tinued through the first Reagan Administration, but not the second. When 
Chairman Greenspan took over, monetary policy responded to the signals 
from President Reagan. This trend did not continue with President George 
H. W. Bush and Chairman Greenspan. Interestingly, however, monetary 
policy did respond to President Clinton’s signals when Chairman Greens-
pan was there. Monetary policy, briefly followed the direction of President 
George W. Bush with Chairman Greenspan. Finally, there is no question 
that monetary policy followed the direction President Obama desired while 
Chairman Bernanke is at the helm, and seems to be currently following 
Chairwoman Yellen. 
These anecdotal examples, however, do not withstand statistical scrutiny, 
such evidence has not been proven to be a comprehensive and systematic 
statistical reality, but rather appears to be “episodic” with most such claims 
unsubstantiated by empirical findings, however (Havrilesky, 1995, p. 37; 
Beck, 1982).
However, there are a number of reasons why the president will use signals 
as a mechanism of successful economic leadership to the Federal Reserve 
(Wood, 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006). Informing the Fed of his policy prefer-
ences is the best, most effective way for the president to overcome the coali-
tion building challenges as well as the vitriolic political process (DiClerico, 
2000). The president wants to signal to the “policy elites” for what he is 
willing to fight, such as a contractionary or expansionary monetary policy 
and provide reassurances of how much commitment he has to his economic/
monetary policy (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006; p. 7). This opportunity enables the 
president to signal the economic groups and policymakers about how their 
actions will be recompensed (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005).
The prevailing theories and research states that the president’s ability to 
employ rhetoric to shape the behavior of economic actors should be substan-
tiated by the fact that the president is the foremost person with economic 
information, which makes him the most visible figure in economic discus-
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sions (Wood, 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). The fact that the president has 
the largest staff of economic actors (National Economic Council, Council 
of Economic Advisors, Office of Management and Budget, Department 
of Treasury, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis) providing him with information and advice makes him 
appear to be the preeminent economic policymaker. The expectation is that 
the president, because of his access to comprehensive information, leads the 
economy, particularly through downturns and prosperity, with rhetoric, sig-
nals, and cues (Wood, 2004). Should this unparalleled role give him a direct 
influence over the economy? In other words, should the Fed be responsive to 
his rhetoric, looking to him for direction, information, and leadership?
Presidents use rhetoric to assert their power and position. Thus, does it 
make it an influential mechanism of presidential power? Sending positive 
and negative signals to the Fed is the president’s way of conveying his policy 
preferences (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006). The 
president hopes the economic speeches function as his mechanism of power, 
an instrument of the modern presidency that conveys what he wants. He 
hopes the signals put pressure on the Fed to act (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006). Suc-
cessfully influencing the Fed, however, is profoundly complicated because 
they are independent so presidents have to rely on their ability to persuade 
them to make decisions about complex and controversial policies: employ-
ment, prices, long-term interest rates, raising interest rates or lowering inter-
est rates (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008; Krause, 1994; Havrilesky, 
1995; Beck, 1982; Morris, 2000; Wood and Waterman, 1994; Weintraub, 
1978; Maisel, 1973). 
The Fed’s Response to Cues and Signals
The signals are, typically, verbal words or cues that presidents speak to the 
policy elites. These signals can offer support for specific programs or they can 
be expressions of their opposition to what the policy elites are actually doing. 
Moreover, the signals can be specific such as requests for changes or actions 
to an existing policy. As long as the president is informing the elites of his 
preferences, what he is doing is a signal (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006).
The cues and signals presidents use can be found in the literature on what 
the Federal Reserve does economically, the attention it pays to unemploy-
ment, inflation, and the interest rates (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006; Dolan, Fren-
dreis, and Tatalovich, 2008). The most pertinent economic indicators, or 
policy tools as the Fed calls them, help to make up the U.S. monetary policy, 
which can make or break a president’s legacy, reelection, or image to the 
“Washingtonians” (Havrilesky, 1995; Neustadt, 1991). Shaping monetary 
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policy is crucial for presidential success (Morris, 2000). The cues and signals 
to the Fed ensure that the president is, in fact, trying to influence the behav-
ior of this particular economic actor.
Should the Fed be receptive of the president’s signals because of cue tak-
ing; their rhetoric is a form of leadership signaling (Whitford and Yates, 
2009)? Do the signals and cues to the Fed engender “cognitive shortcuts” 
in relation to information that is pertinent to the agency (Eshbaugh-Soha, 
2006, p. 38)? Elite policymakers have limited information about the politi-
cal ramifications of most policy decisions. By listening to the president, are 
the policy elites able to make effective decisions about policy because the 
president fills in that information that is lacking, due to his vast network?
The prevailing theories suggests that presidential signals, consistent 
speeches about the state of the economy, and the president’s policy prefer-
ences for the Fed inform the agency of the president’s positions and economic 
goals (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). Using signals that address issues of concern to 
the Fed, the president should be able to influence their decision-making. 
The tone of the speeches filters through to the economic actors and should 
be reflected in their economic behavior, which creates a consistent message 
that can “establish a climate for economic perceptions” (Wood, 2007, p. 14). 
This climate is something that the president can then manipulate or shape, 
according to Wood (2007).
In order to measure whether the Fed is responsive to the signals of the 
president, Havrilesky (1995) created a “SAFER index,” coding every men-
tion in the Wall Street Journal that addressed monetary policy (expansionary 
or contractionary) and some action mentioned by other members of the 
president’s administration such as the Secretary of Treasury and the Council 
of Economic Advisors (p. 118). He found no statistically significant impact 
in the period 1964–1994, when controlling for the White House staff and 
the CEA. The study only looked at one, fairly conservative, economic 
newspaper, rather than a comprehensive timespan of presidential comments 
(Woods and Arthur, 2014; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). Moreover, it is fair 
to assume that the Wall Street Journal is going to mention only those com-
ments they find pertinent to the overall goals of their newspaper (Eshbaugh-
Soha and Peake, 2008).
Moreover, the Clinton Administration’s signals to the bond market did 
not make a significant difference; there was no effect on the thirty-year Trea-
sury Bills despite the rhetoric (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). President George H. 
W. Bush’s signals to the market about the money supply in his State of the 
Union Addresses were not effective (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). In fact, his sig-
nals returned the opposite outcomes. He does, however, find that there is an 
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effect when he controls for the president and the FED chairman (Havrilesky, 
1995). The response of monetary policy to signals does not continue for all 
presidents and chairmen; it only exists for certain periods. 
Such data and results suggest that the president has a limited influence 
over economic and monetary policy (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). Moreover, 
studies show that in the pre-golden (1953–1962), golden (1963–1985), and 
the post-golden (1986–2002) age television eras, presidential rhetoric had 
no significant effect on how the public viewed economic policy (Young and 
Perkins, 2005). The research suggests that the presidents, through their rhe-
torical actions, are limited in their ability to influence economic effects or 
economic indicators directly.
Scholarship really has no comprehensive evidence detailing the extent 
to which presidents send signals to the Fed about economic policy, despite 
a complex and growing literature on presidential signals to various actors, 
and subsequently, no comprehensive evidence suggesting the extent to 
which the Fed responds to the presidential rhetoric (Whitford and Yates, 
2009; Wood, 2007). Therefore, assessing the Fed’s responsiveness to the 
signals in a comprehensive analysis provides an important look into the 
effectiveness of presidential rhetoric to shape economic and monetary 
policy at the Fed. If positivity and/or negativity can predict changes in 
the Federal Funds Rate, then one can confidently state that the presidents 
have the ability to shape the economic behavior of the Fed. The following 
model and hypotheses offer insight into the limitations the aforementioned 
theory has regarding the president’s ability to influence the Fed with signals 
and rhetoric.
Hypotheses for Predicting Changes in the Federal Funds Rate
The data gathered for this particular analysis show that presidents try to sig-
nal the Fed, however, based upon the political realities of their relationship 
with the Fed and the limitations such a relationship imposes on the presi-
dent, they struggle to do so effectively. The statistical model will offer results 
that suggest the aggregated, positive economic rhetoric from the president is 
unable to shape the behavior of the Fed, changes in the Federal Funds Rate 
(FFR) (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008). The expectation is that 
presidential rhetoric is not able to predict the probability that the Fed will 
change the FFR.
H1O: The president’s positive economic rhetoric will predict the probability 
that the Fed will change the FFR.
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H1A: The Fed will respond to the president’s positive economic rhetoric either 
by leaving the FFR where it is or the Fed will lower the FFR.
H2O: The president’s negative economic rhetoric will predict the probability 
that the Fed will lower the FFR.
H2A: The Fed will respond to the president’s negative economic rhetoric either 
by leaving the FFR where it is or the Fed will raise the FFR.
Congressional Pressures on the Federal Reserve
Some have argued that the Fed is more likely to make decisions about mon-
etary policy based upon external pressures from Congress rather than cues or 
signals from the president (Saeki and Shull, 2003). Congress often requires 
that members of the board of governors provide testimony before hearings 
and particular committees about the economy and future economic condi-
tions (Saeki and Shull, 2003). More specifically, the preferences of the Sen-
ate play a significant role in the Fed’s decision to adopt an expansionary or 
a restrictive monetary policy (Morris, 2000). The senators are going to have 
specific preferences based upon the preferences of their constituents and 
their party-ideology (Saeki and Shull, 2003).
The Fed is less likely to choose a direction for monetary policy that would 
encounter opposition in Congress, which has asserted its authority and 
made transparency a major requirement due to the secrecy with which the 
Fed conducted its monetary policy decision-making in the past (Havrilesky, 
1995; Munger and Roberts, 1990). The Fed is now required to present, to 
Congress, its thoughts regarding the Federal Funds Rate and the direction it 
believes the economy is headed. The Fed acquiesced to these demands rather 
than fighting; it feared how aggressively Congress would assert its authority 
and how much autonomy they could potentially lose (Havrilesky, 1995).
The Fed responds to the policy preferences of Congress; they have the 
most influence in the Fed’s role with monetary policy (Munger and Roberts, 
1990; Havrilesky, 1995). More specifically, the Fed is going to pay signifi-
cant attention to the Chairperson of the Senate Banking Committee when 
considering whether they will expand or contract monetary policy, given the 
power of this chairperson: autonomy, agenda-setting, and ability to call hear-
ings, as well as the chairperson’s ability to withstand pressure to compromise 
on their ideological predilections, unlike the president who has a national 
constituency (Saeki and Shull, 2003). The Fed is more likely to make its de-
cision about the economy based upon the preferences of the Senate Banking 
Committee Chairperson rather than the president (Saeki and Shull, 2003).
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The prevailing thought, entrenched in the literature, is that Republicans 
advocate for contractionary monetary policy (higher interest rates) and that 
Democrats seek after expansionary monetary policy (lower interest rates), 
as these approaches best favor their respective constituencies (Keech and 
Morris, 1997; Hibbs, 1987; Havrilesky, 1995). In other words, the ideology 
of the political parties plays a major role in the monetary policy the Fed 
pursues (Hibbs, 1987). Particularly, the Senators are going to have specific 
preferences based upon their constituents and the necessities of their reelec-
tion attempt (Saeki and Shull, 2003). This is overwhelmingly seen in the 
fact that Democratic presidents typically appoint those members who prefer 
lower interest rates more than Republican appointees (Chappell, Havrilesky, 
and McGregor, 1993). This must be factored into the discussion given that 
the Senate must confirm each of the appointees to the Federal Reserve’s 
board of governors.
Congressional intervention into monetary policy mitigates the influ-
ence the president has over the Fed (Havrilesky, 1995). Congress exercises 
a significant influence over the Federal Funds Rate when it communicates 
its policy preferences in the biannual Congressional Oversight Hearings 
on monetary policy (Havrilesky, 1995). Therefore, this analysis seeks to 
determine if the Fed makes changes to the FFR, as a result of the political 
party of the Chairperson of the Senate Banking Committee or the number 
of hearings the Congress has regarding the economy, particularly since the 
literature indicates that the Congress asserts institutional pressures on the 
Fed regarding policy.
H3O: The political party of the chairperson of the Senate Banking Committee 
will predict the type of economic policy the Fed will pursue in its decisions to 
change the FFR.
H3A: The Fed will respond to the political party of the chairperson of the 
Senate Banking Committee by leaving the FFR where it is or pursuing a con-
tractionary or expansionary monetary policy with disregard to party ideology.
H4O: The number of congressional hearings regarding the economy will pre-
dict the probability that the Fed will alter its economic behavior and change 
the FFR.
H4A: The Fed will respond to the number of congressional hearings regarding 
the economy either by leaving the FFR where it is or pursuing a contractionary 
or expansionary monetary policy with disregard to congressional attention to 
the economy.
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The Federal Reserve’s Attention to Economic Conditions
Presidents have not addressed the economy in a major way in five of the last 
eleven recessions. In fact, presidents speak more about non-economic-related 
issues during a recession than economic issues (Hoffman and Howard, 2010). 
They tend to offer fewer speeches during times of recession, inflation, and 
low employment (Ragsdale, 1987). There is a reason for this: constructing 
too dramatic a picture of the economy can have seriously negative effects for 
the president. Moreover, presenting the economy as better than it actually 
is or ignoring the realities makes the president seem out of touch or incom-
petent, both of which can affect his interaction with important political 
actors or the electorate (Hoffman and Howard, 2010). They rarely, if ever, 
make major economic speeches to inform the public how well the economy 
is doing.
The state of the economy accounts for public perceptions of the effective-
ness of political actors (Wood, 2007). According to Dolan, Frendreis, and 
Tatalovich (2008), the public expects the government to keep the economy 
feasible. Despite particular events of national importance, the economy, 
specifically, unemployment and inflation, top Gallup’s “Most Important 
Problem” every year since 1936. The economy is important to the public, 
and they have substantively linked their perceptions of its condition to 
their own personal political behavior. Downturns in the economy affect the 
agenda, reelections, and public perceptions of the president. Moreover, the 
president’s party typically loses congressional seats when the economy is not 
satisfactory (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008).
As stated in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Fed is supposed to 
maximize employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates 
(Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008). This legislative mandate allows 
the Fed to substantively affect inflation. Economic conditions must be con-
sidered a pertinent motivator for the Fed’s decisions to change the Federal 
Funds Rate (Saeki and Shull, 2003). The Fed has a legislative responsibility 
to pursue low unemployment and low inflation, which makes it more likely 
to consider these rates when deciding whether to raise or lower the Federal 
Funds Rate (Beck, 1982). These indicators can better explain the monetary 
policy changes rather than the president’s cues, especially when you consider 
the Fed’s institutional pride and legacy (Beck, 1982).
H5O: The Fed will respond to the changes in GDP (threats of recession) by 
modifying the FFR to combat inflation and unemployment.
H5A: The Fed will use the FFR to pursue a contractionary or expansionary 
monetary policy with disregard to the changes GDP.
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H6O: The Fed will respond to the changes in the inflation rate by modifying 
the FFR to combat inflation and unemployment.
H6A: The Fed will use the FFR to pursue a contractionary or expansionary 
monetary policy with disregard to the changes in the inflation rate.
H7O: The Fed will respond to the changes in the unemployment rate by modi-
fying the FFR to combat inflation and unemployment.
H7A: The Fed will use the FFR to pursue a contractionary or expansionary 
monetary policy with disregard to the changes in the unemployment rate.
Empirical Model
As per the hypotheses above, three models (M1 = the tone of presidential 
rhetoric, M2 = congressional attention to the economy, and M3 = economic 
indicators) were constructed to ascertain the conditions that can create 
changes in the FFR.1 Using content analysis, the rhetorical cues and signals 
the presidents sent to the Fed were coded according to a detailed protocol 
and codebook, as discussed in chapter 1. The Policy Agendas Project data on 
congressional hearings were manipulated to match this model. And, the 
economic data were gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
Each model allowed me to estimate the effects of these independent variables 
on the FFR. The time series analysis was for every president from Dwight 
D. Eisenhower (1954) through Barack H. Obama (2010), as illustrated by 
figure 3.1. The unit of analysis was monthly for each model. For the regres-
sion analysis involving presidential rhetoric, I estimated two lags; each is a 
month in duration. I chose to use a monthly lag because the dependent vari-
able is estimated monthly. Moreover, I chose to use only two of these lags 
because the literature justifies such an action. There are time limits on the 
effectiveness and potency of presidential rhetoric (Whitford and Yates, 2009; 
Edwards, 2009; Edwards, 2003). The policy window of any salient issue the 
president is discussing has limits with regard to the attention span of political 
actors and the public (Kingdon, 1995; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006).
Statistical Method
As with many time series analyses, the Durbin-Watson statistical test in 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Analysis presented first-order 
autocorrelation (AR1) in each model (d = 0.15 for M1, d = 0.22 for M2, and 
d = 0.11 for M3) (Comiskey and Marsh, 2012; Yates and Whitford, 2005). 
Based upon the diagnostics, using a Prais-Winston (1954) regression analysis 
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with the Cochrane–Orcutt estimation allowed me to more appropriately 
estimate the changes in the Federal Funds Rate (Gronke and Miller, 2012; 
Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno, 2005; Whitford and Ochs, 2005; Yates and 
Whitford, 2005; Lowry and Shipan, 2002). Moreover, the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) results indicated that there was no problem with multicollinear-
ity in either of the models and I estimated the regressions with semi-robust 
standard errors after re-specifying the model to mitigate any residual heter-
skedasticity. The model, overall, is in line with the hypotheses2; the predic-
tor variables in this analysis do not significantly affect whether the Federal 
Reserve changes its FFR as a result of the positivity and/or negativity in the 
president’s economic rhetoric. However, as theorized, the results suggest that 
the FFR does respond to congressional behavior and economic indicators.
Independent Variables
Presidential Economic Rhetoric (M1)
Identifying the presidential rhetoric aimed at the Federal Reserve was, 
again, accomplished by using the Public Papers of the President in the American 
Presidency Project, from July 1954 through January 19, 2012. This provided 
the researcher with 1,530 presidential speeches. The population is measured 
over sixty-five years (1946–2012). The presidential cues and signals to the 
Federal Reserve were coded as the ratio of positive speeches to negative and 
neutral speeches (positive ratio ((positive speeches)/(positive speeches + 
negative speeches + neutral speeches)) and the ratio of negative speeches to 
positive and neutral speeches (negative ratio ((negative speeches)/(negative 
speeches + positive speeches + neutral speeches)). I created two, one-month 
lags for each of these variables.
Coding the speeches as “positive” must be differentiated from the notion 
of “optimism,” which is perpetually present in presidential economic rheto-
ric; they are the economy’s unremitting cheerleader. As illustrated by table 
3.3, many of the positive mentions are presidential claims of moving the 
economy towards positive economic growth, such as creating jobs, mitigat-
ing the effects of inflation, lessening the burden to tax payers, or economic 
expansion. As shown by figures 3.4 and 3.5 later in the analysis, presidents 
are generally more positive about the economy and do not often discuss the 
“negative” economy.
For the first model (M1), I included more independent variables to help 
control for the effects of each of the other independent variables that influ-
ence the dependent variable (FFR). I included the actual number of total 
speeches given per month (1 to 78) in order to account for the amount of 
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Table 3.3.  Example Sentences Measuring the Tone of Presidential Rhetoric.
Speeches from the American Presidency Project
D. D. Eisenhower
1/18/1960
This budget attests to the strength of America’s economy. At the 
same time, the budget is a test of our resolve, as a nation, 
to allocate our resources prudently, to maintain the Nation’s 
security, and to extend economic growth into the future without 
inflation.
J. F. Kennedy 
1/24/1963
The chief problem confronting our economy in 1963 is its 
unrealized potential—slow growth, under-investment . . . and 
persistent unemployment.
L. B. Johnson
1/26/1967
Interest rates in 1966 were as high as at any time in forty years. 
They were pushed there by an insatiable demand for credit, 
straining against a deliberately restricted supply. Monetary policy 
in 1966—like tax policy—was properly aimed at slowing down 
an economy expanding too fast.
R. M. Nixon
8/15/1971
The tax reductions I am recommending, together with this broad 
upturn of the economy which has taken place in the first half 
of this year, will move us strongly forward toward a goal this 
Nation has not reached since 1956, fifteen years ago: prosperity 
with full employment in peacetime.
G. R. Ford
12/3/1974
Admittedly, the American economy is in a recession at the present 
time. Inflation pressures are many. Fear of unemployment is 
increasing among our people.
J. E. Carter
1/21/1980
Inflation continues to be our most serious economic problem. 
Restraining inflation remains my highest domestic priority. 
Inflation at the current, unacceptably high levels is the direct 
result of economic problems that have been building, virtually 
without letup, for over a decade. There are no easy answers, or 
quick solutions to inflation. It cannot be eliminated overnight; its 
roots in our economy are too deep, its causes are too pervasive 
and complex.
R. W. Reagan
1/11/1989
Our plans for the economy would cause inflation to soar and bring 
about economic collapse.
G. H. W. Bush
2/12/1991
These shocks hit an economy that was already growing slowly 
for several reasons, including worldwide increases in interest 
rates, tightened credit conditions, and the lingering effects of 
a successful attempt begun in 1988 by the Federal Reserve to 
prevent an acceleration of inflation . . . I know that in some 
regions of our country, people are in genuine economic distress.
W. J. Clinton
6/6/1997
Today we received one more piece of solid evidence that this 
invest-and-grow strategy is working. We learned that our 
economy added 138,000 new jobs and that unemployment 
dropped to 4.8 percent, the lowest in twenty-four years.
G. W. Bush
5/22/2004
With the right policies, we will maintain the strong forward 
momentum of the American economy, which is creating 
thousands of new jobs for American workers.
B. H. Obama
2/24/2011
The economy is now growing. In many sectors we’re seeing 
recovery. But the biggest challenge that we’re seeing right now 
is the fact that unemployment is still way too high all across the 
country.
Adapted from American Presidency Project, 2014.
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attention the president is paying to the economy. To better account for the 
attention, I broke the number of speeches down by tone and included the 
number of negative speeches given per month (0 to 6) and the number of 
positive speeches given per month (0 to 9). Using the number of monthly 
presidential calls for legislation that deal with the economy (0 to 6) will 
further measure the presidential attempts to shape the economy. In addi-
tion to presidential attempts at shaping the economy, the presidents’ party 
affiliations (Democrat (1 = yes or 0 = no); Republican (1 = yes or 0 = no)) 
and their average approval ratings (expressed as a monthly percentage = 0 to 
100 percent) complement the model and ensure that it is specified correctly.
Congressional Attention (M2)
The data at the Policy Agendas Project was used to assess congressional 
behavior in the second model (M2). These data provide the number of total 
congressional hearings on the economy and the number of Senate Banking 
Committee hearings from the 79th Congress to the 110th Congress. From 
this data, I was able to construct six independent variables that are pertinent 
to the analysis. As evidenced by figure 3.2, I aggregated, monthly, the total 
days of hearings on the economy to measure congressional attention to eco-
nomic issues that are important to the Federal Reserve (0 to 57). Moreover, I 
was able to ascertain the number of hearings the Senate Banking Committee 
had regarding economic issues relating to the Federal Reserve’s responsibili-
ties (0 to 15). I excluded those hearings on the economy that had to do with 
appropriations and reauthorizations; including such elements will confuse 
the data and the results (Edwards and Wood, 1999).
In addition to measuring congressional attention to the economy, con-
sidering the importance of party is necessary to measure the differences of 
influence within the committees, particularly because majority parties have 
more resources at their disposal to arrange committees and the shape the 
agenda, as illustrated by figure 3.2 (Aldrich and Rohde, 2000). Moreover, 
what matters are the preferences of individual members of Congress, particu-
larly the median member; bills cannot garner institutional support until they 
pass the majority in the House and the filibuster threat in the Senate (Brady 
and Volden, 2006). Individuals, in a particular context, are able to derail 
the direction of monetary policy; it is not the parties (Krehbiel, 1998). To 
account for this, I created a dummy variable that measures the party of the 
chairman of the Senate Banking Committee (Democrat (1 = yes or 0 = no); 
Republican (1 = yes or 0 = no)). Similarly, I created another dummy vari-
able that measured the party control of the Congress by chamber (Chamber 
Control (House - Democrat (1 = yes or 0 = no); Republican (1 = yes or 0 = 
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no)) and (Senate - Democrat (1 = yes or 0 = no); Republican (1 = yes or 0 
= no))). To better represent the effect of party on the changes in the FFR, I 
created two dummy variables that measure changes in party control (Change 
in Party Leadership (Senate - 1 = yes or 0 = no) and (House - 1 = yes or 0 = 
no)). I also included a dummy variable that measured the presence of divided 
government (1 = president and Congress are a different party; 0 = president 
and Congress are same party).
Table 3.4.  Senate Banking Committee Chairmen Differentiated 
by Political Affiliation and History.
Banking 
Committee
Extracted from the Biographical Directory of the US Congress
Republican Party Democratic Party
1953–1954 Homer E. Capehart (1897–1979)
Republican Party (IN) 1945–1963
1955–1959  J. William Fulbright (1905–1995)
Democratic Party (AR) 1945–1974
1959–1966  A. Willis Robertson (1887–1971)
Democratic Party (VA) 1946–1966
1967–1974  John J. Sparkman (1899–1985)
Democratic Party (AL) 1946–1979
1975–1980 William Proxmire (1915-2005)
Democratic Party (WI) 1957–1989
1981–1986 Jake Garn (1932–)
Republican Party (UT) 1974–1993
1987–1988 William Proxmire (1915– 2005)
Democratic Party (WI) 1957–1989
1989–1994 Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (1938–)
Democratic Party (MI) 1976–1995
1995–1998 Alfonse M. D’Amato (1937–)
Republican Party (NY) 1981–1999
1999–2001 Phil Gramm (1942–)
Republican Party (TX) 1985–2002
2001–2002 Paul S. Sarbanes (1933–)
Democratic Party (MD) 1977–2007
2003–2006 Richard C. Shelby (1934–)
Republican Party (AL) 1987– 
2007–2010 Christopher J. Dodd (1944–)
Democratic Party (CT) 1981–2011
2011–2014 Timothy P. Johnson (1946–)
Democratic Party (SD) 1997–2014
Adapted from Senate Banking Committee Official Website, 2014.
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Economic Indicators (M3)
There are specific economic indicators that are essential to understanding 
the health of the economy: unemployment rate, inflation rate, and the gross 
domestic product (GDP). These data are available on the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. They are monthly and quarterly data. This is crucial for economic 
policymaking for many reasons. For the third model (M3), I coded the unem-
ployment rate each month (3.4 to 10.8), the inflation rate each month (–2.1 
to 14.8), and the quarterly GDP Rate (2332.4 to 13506.4). Political actors, 
particularly presidents and members of Congress, behave differently during 
times of recession (Hoffman and Howard, 2010; Wood, 2007; Dolan, Fren-
dreis, and Tatalovich, 2008). To account for this in the model, I created a 
dummy variable that measures the presence of a recession (1 = yes or 0 = no).
Control Variables
The seven hypotheses presented above are the primary justifications for the 
analysis; however, consideration of how presidential political party plays 
into the Federal Reserve’s economic behavior, how the presidents’ approval 
ratings play a role, the extent to which the presidential calls for legislation 
affect the behavior of the Federal Reserve will also offer insight into the 
Fed’s attention to congressional party leadership. Given the lack of previous 
research on these control variables, this analysis investigated the influence 
of presidential rhetoric, congressional attention, and economic conditions in 
the context of these factors.
Dependent Variable
The Federal Reserve is an independent agency that has substantive influence 
over monetary policy (Morris, 2000). The changes it makes to the Federal 
Funds Rate are indicative of changes in the overall economy, which is why 
the FFR was chosen as one measure of the economic behavior of the Fed 
(Beck, 1982). I obtained the Federal Funds Rate from the Federal Reserve’s 
Statistical Release website from July 1954 through January 2012, as illus-
trated by figure 3.3. There was no reason to code the FFR as it is already pre-
sented in a time-series (monthly) format. The FFR is conveyed in percent-
ages from 0.07 percent to 19.1 each month. The rate does not change every 
month. There are times when the FFR is the same from month to month. 
The Federal Reserve Board is under no obligation to change the FFR from 
month to month. Changing the interest rates or keeping those rates constant 
is their prerogative. 
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Effect of Presidential Rhetoric on the Federal Funds Rate
The first model (M1) is completely in-line with the hypotheses; the positive 
or negative rhetoric and the control variables in this analysis do not signifi-
cantly shape the Federal Reserve’s decision to change the FFR consistently 
over time and in the aggregate. Moreover, the R-Squared and the Adjusted 
R-Squared values indicate that the model is seriously lacking; the use of pres-
idential rhetoric is not a complete picture of what motivates the economic 
behavior of the Federal Reserve. To express this, the regression took the form
FFRi,t = α + γPresidential Rhetorici,t + ßˆ1 Presidential Partyi,t + ßˆ2 Presidential 
Approval Rating + êi,t (M1)
This regression enabled me to test the argument that the president’s position 
as the foremost economic leader allows for the use of rhetoric as a mecha-
nism of presidential power that can influence the behavior of economic ac-
tors. The specification controls for the FFRi,t, wherein the i represents each 
individual rate determined by the Fed in each period t (month). Therefore, I 
regressed the FFRi,t on the rhetoric of the presidents, a vector of different ex-
pressions of presidential speeches (ßˆ1 Positive Ratio i, (t – 1) + (t – 2) + ßˆ2 Negative 
Ratio i, (t – 1) + (t – 2) + ßˆ3 Number of Positive Statementsi,t + ßˆ4 Number of Negative 
Statementsi,t + ßˆ5 Number of Speechesi,t + ßˆ6 Calls for Legislationi,t) as well as 
two control variables signifying aspects of presidential power, namely, party 
identification and presidential approval ratings.
Table 3.5 presents the coefficients, standard errors, semirobust standard 
errors,3 and p-values as well as the measures of fit for the Prais-Winston Re-
gression Analysis. In hypothesis one, I found that the data require a rejection 
of the null hypothesis. It is not significantly more likely that the estimates 
of the ratio of positive economic rhetoric have any influence on the Fed’s 
economic behavior with regard to the FFR. Moreover, the number of posi-
tive statements had no substantive effect on the FFR either. The data suggest 
that the Fed either responded to the president’s positive economic rhetoric 
by leaving the FFR where it was or the Fed lowered it, as the alternative 
hypothesis stated.
The results suggest that the tone, particularly a positive tone, is the not 
the best measure of classification for presidential rhetoric and its effect on 
the economic behavior of the Federal Reserve. As illustrated by figure 3.4, 
there are peaks of presidential positivity regarding the economy; these peaks 
typically correlate with times of economic prosperity, as measured by stan-
dard economic indicators of the economy’s health (Dolan, Frendreis, and 
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Tatalovich, 2008). Despite concentrated efforts by presidents to use toned 
rhetoric to shape behavior, the tone does not adequately engender a response 
to their entrepreneurial agenda. The results suggest, rather, that the Federal 
Reserve is responsive to other conditions more so than the notion that they 
are attentive to the presidential cues regarding the direction the economy 
should go in the future.
In hypothesis two, I also found that the data require a rejection of the 
null hypothesis. It is not significantly more likely that the negative economic 
rhetoric substantively influences the Fed’s economic behavior with regard to 
the Federal Funds Rate (FFR). The changes that did transpire in the FFR are 
statistically indecipherable from no change; it is important to note, however, 
that the p-value was 0.116. The data suggest that the Fed either responded 
to the president’s aggregated, negative economic rhetoric by leaving the FFR 
where it was or the Fed raised the FFR, as the alternative hypothesis stated.
As illustrated by figure 3.5, the negative rhetoric encompasses only 30 
percent of the total statements on the economy. The role the presidents play 
in economic discussions is a difficult balancing act; presidents do not want to 
Table 3.5.  Prais-Winston Regression Estimates of Presidential 
Economic Rhetoric on the  FFR.
Dependent Variable: FFR (Monthly) 
July 1954–January 2012
N = 568
(M1) Rho = 0.9829
Coefficients
Standard 
Errors
SemiRobust 
Standard 
Errors p Values
Ratio Positive Statements 0.0183 0.0897 0.0650 0.839
Ratio Negative Statements 0.1838 0.1166 0.2144 0.116
Positive Lag 1 –0.0327 0.0888 0.0634 0.713
Positive Lag 2 0.0671 0.0762 0.0609 0.379
Negative Lag 1 0.1190 0.1023 0.1692 0.245
Negative Lag 2 0.0576 0.0920 0.1181 0.533
Number Positive Statements –0.0069 0.0246 0.0171 0.779
Number Negative Statements –0.0213 0.0382 0.0487 0.577
Number of Speeches 0.0019 0.0030 0.0031 0.531
Calls for Legislation –0.0161 0.0302 0.0205 0.595
Presidential Approval Rating 0.0005 0.0055 0.0061 0.927
Presidential Party –0.1659 0.2462 0.1500 0.501
F (12, 555) – Statistic = 0.52 (p = 0.9024)    R – Squared = 0.0111
Adjusted R – Squared = –0.0103      MSE = 0.63963
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bring too much attention to the flailing economy with their negative rheto-
ric. They run the risk of an electoral backlash wherein the public blames 
them for the state of the economy (Vavreck, 2009). This reality might 
somewhat factor into the presidential strategy of discussing the economy 
positively most of the time. Nearly 55 percent of their economic rhetoric is 
positive; it is a redirection of sorts (Arthur and Woods, 2013).
The data suggest that classifying presidential economic rhetoric in terms 
of negativity is not the most effective approach for ascertaining the influence 
presidents have over economic actors either; this type of rhetoric is used too 
infrequently to garner a significant influence. The impetus for changes in 
the FFR seems to be influenced by other conditions rather than toned presi-
dential rhetoric. I must note, however, that the more negative speeches the 
president gives, there is a about a five percent negative change in the FFR. 
The second model (M2) is also completely in line with the hypotheses; 
congressional actions and party control provide an appropriate measure of 
influence on the changes to the FFR. To express this, the regression took 
the form
FFRi,t = α + γMember Party Affiliationi,t + γCongressional Attentioni,t + ßˆ1
Presidential Partyi,t + ßˆ2 Divided Governmenti,t + êi,t
This regression enabled me to test the argument that the Federal Reserve is 
more responsive to congressional party affiliations, party changes, and their 
attention to the economy rather than presidential rhetoric and influence. 
Again, the specification controls for the FFRi,t, wherein the i represents each 
individual rate determined by the Fed in each period t (month). Again, we 
regress the FFRi,t on member party affiliations, a vector of various represen-
tations of the importance of party (ßˆ1 Party Sen. Banking Committee Chairi, 
t + ßˆ2 Party Change Senate i, t + ßˆ3 Party Change House i, t + ßˆ4 Party Control 
Housei, t) and another vector of congressional attention (ßˆ1 Days of Congres-
sional Hearingsi, t + ßˆ2 Days of Senate Banking Comm. Hearingsi, t) as well as 
two control variables: divided government and presidential party.
Table 3.6 presents the coefficients, standard errors, semirobust standard 
errors, and p-values as well as the measures of fit for the Prais-Winston 
Regression Analysis. Congressional actions and party control provide a bet-
ter mechanism for assessing the economic behavior of the Federal Reserve. 
In hypothesis three, the data suggest that the Chairperson of the Senate 
Banking Committee (SBC) has a substantive influence with the economic 
decision-making of the Federal Reserve. As presented by table 3.6, the Fed is 
significantly more likely to raise the FFR when the chairman of the Senate 
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Banking Committee is a Republican, indicating that the Fed pays attention 
to the party ideology in Congress regarding the economy. In this instance, 
the Fed pursued a contractionary monetary policy (higher interest rates) 
more so when a Republican was the chairman of the SBC.
In hypothesis four, I measured the effect of congressional hearings in two 
different ways—number of days of hearings on the economy and number of 
days of hearings in the Senate Banking Committee regarding monetary pol-
icy. The statistical effect of the overall number of hearings on the economy 
indicates that the more hearings on the economy Congress has the more 
likely the Fed would lower the FFR; the effect, however, was not distinguish-
able from zero. The hearings in the Senate Banking Committee did have a 
measurable effect, however; it was only at the 0.10 alpha level. The more 
hearings on the economy the SBC has the more likely the Fed raised the FFR.
To further measure the effects of Congress on the changes in the FFR, I 
assessed when each chamber had a change in the majority party. As seen in 
table 3.6, party changes in Congress had a substantive impact on the Fed’s 
economic behavior. For instance, when a party change occurred in the Sen-
ate, the FFR increased substantially and when a party change occurred in the 
Table 3.6.  Prais-Winston Regression Estimates of Congressional 
Economic Behavior on the FFR.
Dependent Variable:  FFR (Monthly) 
July 1954–January 2012
N = 550
(M2) Rho = 0.9772
Coefficients
Standard 
Errors
SemiRobust
Standard 
Errors p Values
Sen. Bank Comm. Chair Party 1.514 .2535 0.8031* 0.0000
Days Congress Hearings –0.0019 .0030 0.0040 0.5280
Sen. Bank Comm. Hearings 0.0274 .0164 0.0220 0.0960
Senate Party Change 0.9869 .1921 0.5458* 0.0000
House Party Change –1.521 .3734 0.6855** 0.0000
Party Control in House –1.504 .5013 0.8357* 0.0030
Divided Government 0.9574 .2072 0.4602** 0.0000
Presidential Party 0.0348 .2420 0.2090 0.8860
F (8, 541) – Statistic = 8.77 (p = 0.0000)    R – Squared = 0.1148 
Adjusted R – Squared = 0.1017      MSE = 0.61316
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
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House, the FFR decreased substantially. One could speculate that the Fed 
is aware of the significance and magnitude of a particular party going from 
the minority party with constrained influence to the majority party, who 
possesses the ability to intervene in the Fed’s organization, mission, and ex-
istence. Regardless of what caused the changes in the chambers, these results 
suggest that that Fed responds to these changes. Moreover, as seen earlier, 
the Fed responds to the party ideology of the respective majority party.
The results here indicate that the Federal Reserve is attentive to Congress 
when considering whether to change the FFR. At the very least, the Fed con-
siders factors such as the majority party in congressional leadership, political 
ideology, and political climate when choosing a particular course of action 
regarding monetary policy. 
The third model (M3) is partly in-line with the hypotheses; the economic 
indicators mostly provide an appropriate estimate of the Fed’s economic be-
havior. To express this, the regression took the form
FFRi,t = α + γEconomic Indicatorsi,t + ßˆ1 Presence of a Recessioni,t + êi,t 
This regression enabled me to test the argument that the Federal Reserve 
is more responsive to the conditions related to the economy rather than 
presidential rhetoric and influence. Again, the specification controls for the 
FFRi,t, wherein the i represents each individual rate determined by the Fed in 
each period t (month). Again, we regress the FFRi,t on the economic condi-
tions, a vector of various economic indicators (ßˆ1 Unemployment Rate i, t + ßˆ2
Inflation Rate i, t + ßˆ3 Gross Domestic Product i, t) as well as a control variable, 
the presence of a recession. Table 3.7 presents the coefficients, standard er-
rors, semirobust standard errors, and p-values as well as the measures of fit for 
the Prais-Winston Regression Analysis. Economic indicators provide a better 
indicator for changes in the FFR than presidential rhetoric does.
In hypothesis five, I measured the effect of GDP on the FFR. The Fed 
raised the FFR as the GDP went down indicating that the direction in the 
hypothesis was correct. The result was indecipherable from zero, as was the 
dummy variable measuring the presence of a recession. As expected, in hy-
potheses six and seven, the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, seem 
to be profoundly instrumental in the Fed’s decision to change the FFR, as 
illustrated by table 3.7. In each decision that the Fed makes, whether to raise 
or lower the FFR, there is a significant result for unemployment and infla-
tion. Particularly, as the unemployment rate decreases, the Fed raises the 
FFR, an indicator that the economy is getting better. These data suggest that 
the Fed is most likely responding to the economic indicators rather than the 
14_247_Arthur.indb   60 5/27/14   5:23 AM
Presidential Rhetoric and the Federal Reserve  •  61
Table 3.7.  Prais-Winston Regression Estimates of Pertinent 
Economic Indicators on the FFR.
Dependent Variable:  FFR (Monthly) 
July 1954–January 2012
N = 550
(M3) Rho = 0.9787
Coefficients
Standard 
Errors
SemiRobust 
Standard 
Errors p Values
Unemployment Rate –0.6450 0.1253 0.1874** 0.000
Inflation Rate 0.1836 0.0584 0.0761* 0.002
Gross Domestic Product –0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.524
Recession 0.0351 0.1509 0.0984 0.816
F (4, 545) – Statistic = 9.70 (p = 0.0000)    R – Squared = 0.0665
Adjusted R – Squared = 0.0596     MSE = 0.6273
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.001
rhetoric from the president, which makes sense given their legal obligation 
and concern with inflation and unemployment (Edwards and Wood, 1999). 
Therefore, one might speculate that if the economy is getting better, the Fed 
is more likely to raise the FFR as a result of those healthful indicators rather 
than the positive rhetoric from the president, which is most likely a result of 
the positive economy.
Conclusion
The Fed is responsible for regulating inflation by altering interest rates on 
monies loaned to banks. Their ability to change the Federal Funds Rate 
has a substantial impact on the economy (Frumkin, 2004). Because of the 
Fed’s role in the economy, presidential administrations are highly concerned 
with this bureaucratic organization; the decisions the Fed employs can make 
the achievement of other economic policy goals difficult. Yet, there is no 
consensus or substantive discussion in the literature as to the ability of the 
president to effectively use rhetoric, cues, and signals to shape the economic 
behavior of one of the most substantial economic actors—the Federal Re-
serve. However, extent research indicates that political actors respond and 
produce cues as a mechanism of political behavior and persuasion (Yates and 
Whitford, 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006; Edwards and Wood, 1999; Light, 
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1999). Therefore, this analysis sought an answer as to whether presidents 
try to shape the Fed with rhetorical cues and the extent to which they are 
successful. 
There is a literature that argues that presidential rhetoric is able to mo-
tivate certain economic actors by signaling their tone, their political posi-
tion, and their level of commitment (Wood, 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006). 
However, that literature, specifically, glosses over the externalities that 
potentially affect the changes in the economy, the constraints of the sepa-
rated system of American government, and the limitations inherent in the 
president’s ability to use rhetoric to achieve desired results. My analysis has 
allowed for a more comprehensive research operationalization rather than ar-
guing that the president’s ability to change economic indicators comes from 
his position as the most important economic actor in the system (Wood, 
2007; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2007). By expanding the data sources and the audi-
ence of pertinent economic actors, I offered a more comprehensive assess-
ment of presidential influence with economic actors and the results suggests 
that previous research might not be the definitive word on the presidential 
influence (Wood, 2007).
These results have further contributed to the extant literature by ascer-
taining that the president does intend to cue or signal the Fed about which 
direction he wants monetary policy to go in the future. Further, it determines 
that the president, through the use of positive and negative economic rheto-
ric, is not overly successful in shaping the Fed’s economic behavior, as seen 
in the changes to the Federal Funds Rate. This analysis does confirm what 
others have stated, namely, that presidents have increased their rhetoric on 
the economy significantly (Wood, 2007). However, my research suggests 
that the increased rhetoric and attention to the economy has not brought 
about the desired effects for which presidents advocate. The changes in the 
FFR were not statistically significant and could not be recognized from zero. 
Moreover, when considering the Fed’s claim of independence from politics, 
it is unlikely that they would risk congressional intervention and changes to 
their organization because they did the bidding of a sitting president. Sec-
ondly, the Fed is unlikely to help a sitting president in an election year; the 
Fed’s intervention in an election may harm the organization more so than 
any political capital it may gain by meddling (Beck, 1982). Therefore, it is 
more likely that the economic behavior of the Federal Reserve is shaped by 
congressional party affiliations, party changes, and their attention to the 
economy as well as economic indicators rather than the cues and signals the 
president sends to the Fed.
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The results actually provided three specific components that show the ex-
tent to which the Federal Reserve pays attention to the presidents’ rhetoric, 
congressional actions, and indicators of the economy’s strength. Conducting 
the analysis in this manner provided a picture of how the presidents discuss 
the economy in their speeches, particularly with regard to the tone. These 
results suggest that the Fed did not respond to the rhetorical cues and signals; 
the rhetorical assessment of the economy does not shape how the Federal 
Reserve reacts to presidential assessments of the economy. The presidential 
rhetoric did not have a substantive effect on the raising or lowering of the 
FFR because of the tone within speeches (positive/negative). Such an un-
derstanding provides insight into presidential influence over economic ac-
tors and the economy; it is clear that the lack of significance in presidential 
rhetoric’s ability to predict changes in the Federal Funds Rate is telling from 
a “rhetoric as mechanism of influence” perspective. Despite presidential at-
tempts to tailor their rhetoric to influence specific actors, they are incredibly 
unsuccessful, in nearly every way.
Notes
1. Regressing the FFR on every variable in all three models was not substantively 
different than creating three models. It made more sense, theoretically, to differenti-
ate the models.
2. I must attach a word of caution about some of my hypothesis. Publishing 
null hypotheses is difficult. However, it is not unprecedented when warranted. 
Many scholars have done this. Not all of the hypotheses in the entire book take 
the “null hypothesis” approach, however. Those that do are warranted. However, 
I must argue that this analysis, based upon the theory and its response to the ex-
tant literature, warrants the “null hypothesis” approach. Therefore, if there is no 
effect, I am correct; there is no consideration of the magnitude by which rhetoric 
affects the FFR. I was not interested in magnitude, but rather the president’s ability 
to influence the decision making of an economic actor with the tone present in 
the rhetoric. I assume that my alternative hypothesis is correct until I could find 
evidence that it was incorrect. No such evidence could be found in this instance. 
I set up the analysis this way on purpose. I know that it makes it easier to obtain 
and justify my results. I think that the analysis still warrants a contribution to the 
literature. I took multiple measures to ensure that I gave presidential rhetoric a 
chance to make an impact. I differentiated the rhetoric by the tone of the speech, 
the type of speech as well as the time-period; it was not a simple aggregation of 
words. However, one could still read the results with caution because the rhetoric 
used was a stratified random sample and not the complete analysis of every word 
every president spoke.
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3. The Semi Robust Standard Errors were included in the Tables to simply indi-
cate the changes that the Cochrane–Orcutt estimation made to the standard errors 
in the Prais-Winston Regression Analysis. The significance of each variable was not 
changed substantively. However, I have indicated the changes in alpha levels, which 
were noteworthy.
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